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I. INTRODUCTION
Consistent with all other state and federal law, West Virginia recognizes
the attorney-client privilege. In State ex rel. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Canady,' the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has adopted the defini-
tion of the privilege first enunciated in United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp.2
[t]he privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the
* Mr. Rice is a Professor of Law at the American University Washington College of Law, where he
has taught evidence for the past twenty-five years. He is a 1968 graduate of the West Virginia University
College of Law, and author of two leading treatises on the attorney-client privilege, Attomey-Client Privilege
in the United States (Lawyer's Cooperative 1993) and Attorney-Client Privilege: State Law (Rice Publishing
1998).
460 S.E.2d 677 (W. Va. 1995).
2 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
1
Rice: A Quasi-Attorney-Client Privilege--West Virginia's Mislabeled Fid
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1998
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to
whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar
of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this
communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication
relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his
client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose
of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal
services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d)
for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the
privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the
client.3
While West Virginia has traditionally been consistent with virtually all
other jurisdictions in interpreting and applying the elements of this commonly rec-
ognized definition, 4 the West Virginia Supreme Court recently broke ranks to iden-
tify what it described as a "quasi attorney-client privilege." 5 While characterized
by the court in State ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gaughan as a "new privilege," the
privilege, in fact, is little more than an adoption of the long-recognized exception to
the existing privilege for breaches of fiduciary duty.6 This mischaracterization
clouds an already complex rule that is widely misunderstood and misapplied. It
adds confusion where clarity is desperately needed.
Gaughan arose from a personal injury action filed by Carol Thoburn
against Timothy Mirandy, who was insured by the Allstate Insurance Company.
Thoburn was a passenger in a car that was hit by a vehicle driven by Mirandy. In
settlement negotiations, Allstate offered Thoburn the amount of $20,000. Rejecting
this offer, Thoburn counter offered for the policy limit of $100,000, which Allstate
rejected. At the resulting trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Thoburn for
$229,500. Thoburn subsequently filed a bad faith settlement claim against Allstate
alleging that by refusing to settle the claim against Mirandy, Allstate violated West
Virginia. Code section 33-11-4(9). 7
3 Id. at 358-59.
4 See P.R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: State Law (Rice Publishing 1998).
5 See generally State ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gaughan, 508 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1998).
6 See generally Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1968); see also P.R. Rice, Attor-
ney-Client Privilege in the United States § 8:22 (Lawyers Cooperative 1993).
7 The record did not identify the specific subsection or subsections of W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9)
that Thobum argued to the lower court in support of his proposition. The relevant subsections OF W. VA.
CODE § 33-11-4(9) that Thobum might have argued provide as follows:
(a) Misrepresenting pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating to cov-
erages at issue;
(b) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications
with respect to claims arising under insurance policies;
(c) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investi-
[Vol. 101:311
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In discovery Thoburn demanded that Allstate produce, among other things,
documents in the investigative claim file maintained by Allstate relating to the
Thoburn action against Mirandy. Although Allstate objected on the grounds that
the documents were protected by attorney-client privilege, the Circuit Court or-
dered Allstate to produce the entire file, including privileged documents. Allstate
appealed seeking relief through a writ of prohibition.8 The Supreme Court of Ap-
gation of claims arising under insurance policies;
(d) Refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based
upon all available information;
(e) Failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after
proof of loss statements have been completed;
(f) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements
of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear;,
(g) Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an in-
surance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered
in actions brought by such insureds, when such insureds have made claims for
amounts reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered;
(h) Attempting to settle a claim for less than the amount to which a reasonable man
would have believed he was entitled by reference to written or printed advertising
material accompanying or made part of an application; ...
(in) Failing to promptly settle claims, where liability has become reasonably clear,
under one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence settle-
ments under other portions of the insurance policy coverage.
8 W. VA. CODE § 53-1-1 (1994) provides:
The writ of prohibition shall lie as a matter of right in all cases of usurpation
and abuse of power, when the inferior court has not jurisdiction of the subject
matter in controversy, or, having such jurisdiction, exceed its legitimate pow-
ers.
Because this ruling involved the compelled disclosure of confidential materials that were exempt from dis-
covery, and was a clear legal error resulting from the trial court's substantial abuse of its discretion, the court
held that it had jurisdiction to correct the error. See Canady, 460 S.E.2d 677 ('Consistent with our prior
decisions, we carve out today a specific exception to the general rule: When a discovery order involves the
probable invasion of confidential materials that are exempted from discovery under Rule 26(b)(1) and (3) of
the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, the exercise of this Court's original jurisdiction is appropriate.
The reason for this exception is apparent: If the privilege and/or immunity to keep confidential materials
from being delivered to the opponent pursuant to court order is not vindicated before the violation occurs,
then this sacred privilege and/or immunity is no privilege and/or immunity at all but a cruel illusion. In short,
the attomey-client privilege and work product exception would be lost forever if the offended party is forced
to "run the gauntlet" before having an opportunity to seek redress before this Court."); see State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Stephens, 425 S.E.2d 577 (NV. Va. 1992).
In determining whether to grant a rule to show cause in prohibition when d
court is not acting in excess of its jurisdiction, this Court will look to the ade-
quacy of other available remedies such as appeal and to the over-all economy
of effort and money among litigants, lawyers and courts; however, this Court
will use prohibition in this discretionary way to correct only substantial,
1998]
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peals of West Virginia granted the writ subject to Thoburn's demonstrating a
"compelling need" for the privileged materials sought from the file.9
I. DISCOVERY OF INSURANCE COMPANY CLAIMS FILES IN THIRD-PARTY BAD
FAITH ACTIONS
Gaughan involved a third party bad faith action, as opposed to the more
common first-party bad faith action. While these actions are identical in theory-
both are premised on the breach of a fiduciary duty owed by the insurance com-
pany q--in the first-party action the insured (the policyholder) is suing his insur-
ance company. In a third-party bad faith action the insurance company is being
sued by the individual who prevailed in the preceding civil action against the in-
sured tortfeasor. Because the third-party action involves a plaintiff to whom the
insurance company did not owe a contractual duty under the insurance policy, most
state jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have refused to find an implied
statutory duty under legislative schemes similar to those in West Virginia." They
clear-cut, legal errors plainly in contravention of a clear statutory, constitu-
tional, or common law mandate which may be resolved independently of any
disputed facts and only in cases where there is a high probability that the trial
will be completely reversed if the error is not corrected in advance.
Hinkle v. Black, 262 S.E.2d 744 (W. Va. 1979).
9 See Gaughan, 508 S.E.2d at 96.
10 This duty was created by W. VA. CODE §§ 33-11-1 to 10. In Jenkins v. J. C. Penny Casualty Ins.
Co., 280 S.E.2d 252 (W. Va. 1981), the court held that "[t]here can be little question in reviewing the entire
[Unfair Insurance Practices ] Act that it is not limited to activities between the insured and the insurance
company. Among the unfair claim settlement practices there are a number of broadly worded prohibitions
which are equally applicable to third parties as well as insureds." The court went on to explain why a private
cause of action by a third-party may be instituted, despite the fact that nothing other than an administrative
remedy is provided for in the statute:
In those situations where a statute has granted a class of persons certain rights
and there is no statutory language indicating that the administrative remedies
provided in the statute are to be considered exclusive, the United States Su-
preme Court has found an implied private cause of action. [Cannon v. Univer-
sity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 707 (1979)] ....
A further factor ... is to determine whether the private cause of action is con-
sistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative act. Certainly, in the
area of unfair settlement practices, the right to a private cause of action is
consistent with the underlying legislative purpose, which is to prevent im-
proper settlement practices. The right of a person injured as a result of an un-
fair settlement practice to recover damages acts as a deterrent against viola-
tions of the act. We conclude that a private cause of action is consistent with
the underlying purpose of the act.
Moreover, the legislative policy encouraging prompt settlement of meritori-
ous claims parallels our longstanding judicial policy that encourages com-
promise and settlement of disputed claims. ...
Id. at 606-07.
11 The court in Gaughan cited seventeen jurisdictions: Messina v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 998
F.2d 2 (D.C. Cir. 1993); McFadden v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 803 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Miss. 1992), af'd,
[Vol. 101:311
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have noted that the third-party is not, in fact, injured since he obtained a judgment
in excess of policy limits, and, it is generally believed that finding such a statutory
duty for the insurer toward the third-party would be inconsistent with the contrac-
tual duty that the insurance company owes to the insured. Consequently, third-party
bad faith actions generally have not been permitted.
The Gaughan Court correctly acknowledged that jurisdictions are split
over the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to requests for documents by
third-party bad faith plaintiffs.12 However, the court claimed that the majority view
is that third-parties cannot access the files without the consent of the insurance
companies.' 3 This is a curious claim since the question of the applicability of the
attorney-client privilege to discovery requests by a third-party in a bad faith settle-
ment action had been addressed and denied in only one jurisdiction - Montana.14
Regardless, the Gaughan Court found more palatable the approach taken by a
Florida court in Dunn v. National Sec. Fire & Cas. Co.,15 where the attorney-client
privilege was overridden and access was given to the claim files under a fiduciary
duty rationale.' 6
III. THE FLORIDA APPROACH
In Dunn, Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeals distinguished between
communications in the claim file that were generated before and after the judgment
against the insured policyholder that forms the basis of the third-party's action
988 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1993); Earth Scientists v. United States Fidelity & Guar., 619 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Kan.
1985); Wilson v. Wilson, 468 S.E.2d 495 (N.C. 1996); Dvorak v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 508
N.W.2d 329 (N.D. 1993); Herrig v. Herrig, 844 P.2d 487 (Wyo. 1992); Gunny v. Allstate Ins. Co., 830 P.2d
1335 (Nev. 1992); Bates v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 467 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1991); City of Farmington v. L.
R. Foy Const. Co., 816 P.2d 473 (N.M. 1991); O.K. Lumber Co., Inc. v. Providence Washington Ins. Co.,
759 P.2d 523 (Alaska 1988); Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1988); Morris v.
American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1986); Tank v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,
715 P.2d 1133 (Wash. 1986); Wilder v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 433 A.2d 309 (Vt. 1981); Kranzush
v. Badger State Mutual Casualty Co., 307 N.W.2d 256 (Wis. 1981); Scroggins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 393
N.E.2d 718 (Il. 1979); Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576 (N.H. 1978); Farris v. U.S.
Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 587 P.2d 1015 (Or. 1978).
As explained in O.K Lumber,
[t]he fiduciary relationship inherent in every insurance contract gives rise to
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.... Thus, an insurer has
an obligation to investigate claims and to inform the insured of all settlement
offers and the possibility of excess recovery by the injured claimant.... The
insured may sue for damages caused by the insurer's breach of its duty.
O.K Lumber, 759 P.2d at 525.. While the court concluded that "[t]he insured's cause of action for breach of
[this] covenant is assignable to the injured third party claimant," it held that independent of an assignment the
third party claimant could not sue as a third party beneficiary of the covenant for its breach. Id.
12 See Gaughan, 508 S.E.2d at 87.
13 See id. at 88-89.
14 See State ex rel. USF&G Co. v. Montana Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 783 P.2d 911, 913 (Mont.
1989). None of the cases cited in USF&G involved third-party plaintifts initiating actions against insurers.
Is See Dunn v. National Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 631 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
16 Gaughan, 508 S.E.2d at 89.
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against the insurance company.
A. Documents Generated Before Judgment
In third-party bad faith settlement actions under Florida's statutory
scheme, the court initially gave the third-party plaintiff access to all materials in the
insurance company's claim file that had been created before the judgment that
formed the basis for the bad faith settlement claim-that is, the judgment in excess
of the policy limits:
In bad faith suits against insurance companies for failure to
settle within the policy limits, all materials in the insurance
company's claim file up to the date the judgment in the un-
derlying suit are obtainable, and should be produced when
sought by discovery ....
Discovery of the insurer's claim file and litigation file is
allowed in a bad faith case over the objections of the insurer
that production of the file would violate the work product or
attorney[-]client privilege. The rationale (as discussed
above) is because the injured third party "stands in the
shoes" of the insured party in a third party bad faith case
and the insurer owed a fiduciary duty to its insured.
17
The Dunn decision did not differentiate between the two types of third-
party actions for bad faith settlement: (1) statutory actions created by an Unfair
Claim Settlement Practices Act, and (2) common law actions arising through the
contract obligations of the insurance company--originating on behalf of the in-
sured and assigned to the third-party/judgment creditor who thereafter stands in the
insured's shoes as a successor-in-interest. In both situations Florida apparently per-
ceives the third-party as "standing in the shoes" of the insured. Consequently, the
discovery rights of third-parties in both types of actions are the same as those that
the insured would have had against the insurance company as a joint client in a
first-party bad faith settlement action. If the third-party action under the statute in
Dunn had been seen as an independent third-party claim, rather than one acquired
through the insured (joint client of the insurer), an independent basis for overriding
the privilege would have had to have been found in order to conclude that insur-
ance company's privilege could not be successfully employed. This is the position
from which the Gaughan Court created its "quasi" attorney-client privilege.
1. Joint Clients: What Rights to Confidential Communications Do
They Possess?
Joint clients are an exception to the principle that disclosure of confidential
17 Dunn, 631 So. 2d at 1109.
[Vol. 101:311
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communications to a third party waives the privilege protection."8 All communica-
tions between the common attorney and that attorney's clients are presumed to be
for the benefit of the joint endeavor. Consequently, no communications in further-
ance of that joint representation are confidential vis-a-vis a joint client who is not
present at the time of the communication. Therefore, no single joint client can as-
sert the attorney-client privilege in subsequent litigation between themselves to
deny either access to or use of those communications.1" Nothing in the client's case
file would be protected by the attorney-client privilege vis-a-vis the insured (poli-
cyholder). As a consequence, when the policyholder subsequently sues the insurer
for bad faith in its failed attempts to settle the claim that resulted in a judgment in
excess of the policy limits (what is called a first-party bad faith action), the policy-
holder has an unfettered right of access to the contents of the file.2"
2. Successors-in-Interest: What Rights Do They Acquire?
Successors-in-interest are those who acquire their rights from another."1 A
purchaser is a successor-in-interest to the seller relative to the duty of care that was
owed to the seller by the manufacturer of the product that the seller originally ac-
quired and conveyed on to the purchaser. The concept, however, extends beyond
the conveyance of property. The trustee of a corporate client acquires the privilege
rights of the client upon his appointment.' After a party obtains a judgment against
18 The attorney-client privilege is waived by voluntary disclosures to third parties. See State ex rel.
McCormick v. Zakaib, 430 S.E.2d 316, 319 (W. Va. 1993) ("Even assuming, arguendo, that the original
information contained in the three sealed documents was confidential and protected by the attorney-client
privilege, Allstate waived this privilege by voluntarily producing the claim files in response to the plaintiff's
discovery request."); Marano v. Holland, 366 S.E.2d 117, 132 (W. Va. 1988) (finding attorney-client privi-
lege waived by voluntary testimony of defense-retained psychologists); Bennett v. Bennett, 70 S.E.2d 894,
898-99 (W. Va. 1952) (finding client waived privilege as to subject of attorney's authorization to appear in
divorce action by her own testimony about authorization of attorney), disapproved on other grounds by
Gallaher v. Gallaher, 128 S.E.2d 464 (W. Va. 1962). See generally Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege:
State Law § 9:27 (Rice Publishing 1998).
19 See Kirchner v. Smith, 58 S.E. 614, 619-20 (W. Va. 1907) (observing that plaintiffs and defen-
dants together employed attorneys to prepare contract, obtain title, and advise parties and concluding that
joint client privilege was therefore inapplicable between parties).
See, e.g., Longs v. Drug Store v. Howe, 657 P.2d 412 (Ariz. 1983); Alseike v. Miller, 412 P.2d
1007 (Kan. 1966); Baker v. CNA Ins. Co., 123 F.R.D. 322,326 (D. Mont. 1988).
21 See Catino v. Travelers Ins. Co., 136 F.R.D. 534, 537 (D. Mass. 1991) ("To the extent that Galla-
gher [the attorney] had an attorney-client relationship with both Nowlan and Travelers and both Nowlan and
Travelers were his client, ' ... there can be no privilege on the part of the company [Travelers] to require the
lawyer [Gallagher] to withhold information from his other client, the policyholder [Nowan]'.... Since
Catino, by virtue of the assignment, now possesses all of Nowlan's rights, there is no attorney-client privilege
between Gallagher and Travelers as against Catino, at least for the period of time when Gallagher represented
both."); Dickerson v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99 (1st Dist. 1982) ("Here, the client holding the
privilege, ADZ, Inc., was merged into Santa Clara Publishing, Inc. and has ceased to exist. The attorney-
client privilege, originally held by ADZ, Inc., is now held by its successor-in-interest, Santa Clara Publishing,
Inc."); Texaco, Inc. v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 264 A.2d 523 (Del. Ch. 1970) (the trustee is a successor-in-
interest with rights to assert or waive the privilege).
22 See Texaco, 264 A.2d 523 (the trustee is a successor-in-interest with rights to assert or waive the
privilege).
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the insured in excess of policy limits, if the insurance company had failed to nego-
tiate the settlement of the claim in good faith, the breach of duty that the insurance
company's bad faith represents constitutes a tortious act giving rise to a common
law cause of action on behalf of the insured/tortfeasor. This can place the judgment
creditor in the same position as the judgment debtor relative to the insurance com-
pany's breach of duty,23 particularly if the insured/tortfeasor assigns his claim to
the party he injured (and who obtained the judgment).24 The judgment creditor
steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor.
B. Documents Created After the Date of the Judgment
For documents created after the date of the judgment against the policy-
holder, the Dunn Court held that a third-party bad faith plaintiff could gain access
only "with a showing of good cause."'25 The third-party was considered a succes-
sor-in-interest to the insured policyholder---"'stand[ing] in the shoes' of the in-
23 The Florida courts have also held that "a plaintiff in a personal injury action who obtained a
judgment against a defendant in excess of the defendant's insurance coverage could bring an action for bad
faith against the insurance company without an assignment from the defendant insured on the third party
beneficiary theory." See Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 325 So. 2d 416, 417 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976) cert. denied, 336 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1976) (quoting Thompson v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. of New
York, 250 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1971)). The court in Gutierrez went on to say that as a third party beneficiary of
the insurance policy, the plaintiff stands in the same posture as the insured. Gutierrez, 325 So. 2d at 417.
Since he stands in the shoes of the insured, the initial party plaintiff may compel disclosure of the insurer's
entire case file. See also Dunn v. National Sec. Fire and Cas. Co., 631 So. 2d 1103, 1109 (Fla. Dist Ct. App.
1993) pet. granted, National Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Dunn, 652 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) ("In
bad faith suits against insurance companies for failure to settle within the policy limits, all materials in the
insurance company's claim file up to the date the judgment in the underlying suit are obtainable, and should
be produced when sought by discovery.... Discovery of the insurer's claim file and litigation file is allowed
in a bad faith case over the objections of the insurer that production of the file would violate the work product
or attorney/client privilege.... The rationale ... is because the injured third party 'stands in the shoes' of the
insured party in a third party bad faith case and the insurer owed a fiduciary duty to its insured.").
In United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Jennings, the court explained:
Generally, the third party in a third party bad-faith action stands in the shoes
of the insured and is entitled, therefore, to discovery of the insurer's entire
claims file on the underlying tort claim up to the date of an excess judgment,
notwithstanding any objections from the insurer based on the attorney-client
or work product privileges. . . . While there is not case law discussing
whether this broad scope of discovery is available in a case involving a Cun-
ningham stipulation rather than an excess judgment, we see no reason why the
two circumstances should be treated differently.
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Jennings, 707 So. 2d 384,385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (per curiam).
24 In Iowa, where third-party bad faith actions are not recognized, the Supreme Court permitted an
action to be brought by the judgment creditor on behalf of the judgment debtor who assigned his claim
against the insurance company to the third-party. See Kooyman v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 315 N.W.2d 30
(Iowa 1982). "In Kooyman, the plaintiff, representing the injured party, received from the tortfeasor, as part
of a settlement, an assignment of the tortfeasor's claim for bad faith against its own insurance company.
Plaintiff then sued the tortfeasor's insurer in an 'excess judgment' action alleging bad faith." Bates v. Allied
Mut. Ins. Co., 467 N.W.2d 255, 258 (Iowa 1991).
25 Dunn, 631 So. 2d at 1109.
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sured party." 26 Therefore, third-party bad faith plaintiffs were given the same right
of access as the first-party bad faith plaintiffs (the insured/policyholders)-upon a
showing of "good cause"-a showing that the evidence was necessary to estab-
lishing the claim and not otherwise reasonably available.
The court did not indicate why either the insured or a third-party plaintiff
should be given access to files created after the fiduciary relationship between
those individuals and the insurance company has expired. This part of the decision
is particularly troublesome because an insurance company's communications with
counsel after that point would focus on the defense of itself, rather than the defense
of the insured. Opening the files at this point would preclude the insurance com-
pany from effectively defending itself against the insured's charge of bad faith, at a
time when there would be neither a mutuality of interests nor joint representation.
IV. THE GAUGHANDECISiON
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia was not prepared to fol-
low the approach outlined by the Montana Court in USF&G or the Florida Court in
Dunn. To follow Montana's "majority" view and deny a third-party bad faith
plaintiff access to the insured's claim file would "seriously impede[] a third-party's
ability to prove a bad faith claim."27 On the other hand, treating the third-party like
the insured, as the Florida Court did in Dunn, and giving her free access to the
claim file could "chill open and honest communications," thereby having a devas-
tating 'impact on an attorney's ability to fully advise a client." 28 Therefore, the
court in Gaughan gave a qualified right of access to the file that seemed identical to
the Dunn decision, but characterized its decision as being different by "craft[ing] a
more practical approach."29
In pursuing this intermediate position, the Gaughan Court chose to break
new ground by creating what the court dubbed a "quasi attorney-client privilege."
It applies to communications in an insured's claim file generated on and after the
filing date of a third-party's complaint against an insurer-the point at which the
Dunn Court concluded that the third-party had to demonstrate "good cause" to
obtain access. The court explained the parameters of this new privilege:
We... hold that in a third-party bad faith action where an
insured has signed a release of his/her claim file to a third-
party litigant, an insurer may raise a quasi attorney-client
privilege to communication in the insured's claim file. The
quasi attorney-client privilege belongs to the insurer, not the
insured, and may be waived only by the insurer.
Second, we must carefully articulate the parameters of the
26 Id.
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quasi attorney-client privilege herein established. As an ini-
tial matter, we note that an attempt to protect from disclo-
sure documents in a claim file that were prepared prior to
the filing of a third-party's underlying suit against the in-
sured is properly maintained by asserting the work product
rule .... Consequently, we hold that all communications in
an insured's claim file that were generated prior to the filing
date of a third-party's underlying complaint against the in-
sured are not protected by the quasi attorney-client privi-
lege. All communications in an insured's claim file gener-
ated on and after the filing date of a third-party's complaint
against an insured, are presumptively quasi attorney-client
privilege communications. Furthermore, we note that prior
to the filing of a third-party's underlying suit against the in-
sured, the majority of documents in the claim file would not
fulfill the elements required to gain protection under the
attorney-client privilege. Conversely, after the filing of the
underlying suit, the number of documents subject to the at-
torney-client privilege radically increases .... We therefore
hold that where a third-party has obtained a release from the
insured giving the third-party access to all communications
in the insured's claim file, in order for the third-party to
seek discovery of communications in the claim file gener-
ated on or after the date the third-party filed his/her com-
plaint against the insured, the third-party must provide some
reasonable description of each communication he/she seeks
that was generated on or after the date the third-party filed
his/her complaint against the insured. In other words, the
third-party may not merely request all communication in the
claim file generated on or after the filing date of the com-
plaint against the insured. Thereafter, if the insurer raises
the quasi attorney-client privilege to such specifically re-
quested communication, the insurer must prove the ele-
ments of the traditional common law attorney-client privi-
lege for each communication it seeks to shield from discov-
ery through assertion of the quasi attorney-client privilege.
The trial court must then make an independent determina-
tion for each communication the insurer seeks to shield
from discovery. If the trial court determines that some or all
of the specifically requested communication has been
shown to satisfy the elements of the traditional common law
attorney-client privilege, then such communication is pro-
tected from disclosure by the quasi attorney-client privilege.
We note, however, that if the insurer fails to establish all the
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elements of the traditional common law attorney-client
privilege for any specifically requested communication,
such communication must be produced to the third-party.
Traditional attorney-client privileged material is virtually
undiscoverable under Rule 26(b) of the West Virginia Rules
of Civil Procedure. However; applying such complete pro-
tection to documents subject to the quasi attorney-client
privilege herein created for the unique situation presented
by third party-bad faith suits is inequitable. Often, the
plaintiff in a third-party bad faith suit has no reasonable
means of proving his or her claim without the benefit of
certain documents contained in the claim file. In order to
temper this unduly harsh result, and to advance the balance
between the competing interests of full disclosure of the
facts and open attorney-client communication, we hold that
a third party may, in some instances, obtain discovery of
documents found to be protected by the quasi attorney-
client privilege. To obtain such documents, the third-party
must show a "compelling need" for each communication
that has been found to be protected from disclosure by the
quasi attorney-client privilege. To satisfy the quasi attorney-
client privilege compelling need test, the third-party must
show that (1) the specifically requested protected communi-
cation cannot reasonably be obtained elsewhere and (2) that
the specifically requested protected communication could
reasonably be interpreted by the fact finder as tending to
prove an element of the bad faith cause of action or (3) that
the specifically requested protected communication could
reasonably be used to lead to the discovery of facts that tend
to prove an element of the bad faith cause of action. Any
protected communication for which the third-party satisfies
the quasi attorney-client privilege compelling need test must
be produced to the third-party.30
While the Gaughan Court acknowledged that West Virginia has recog-
nized third-party insurance bad faith settlement cases, 31 as well as first-party bad
faith settlement cases,32 and that it is agreed that the insured in first-party actions
generally has access to all documents in his claim file,3 the court would not give to
the third-party, Thobum, the same rights extended to the insured, Mirandy, even
though Mirandy had given Thobum a release for the claim file. Further, the court
30 Id. at 89-91.
31 See id. at 87, n.16.
32 See id. at 87, n.14.
33 See Gaughan, 508 S.E.2d at 87, n.17.
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noted that it was "[p]articularly noteworthy... that Ms. Thoburn secured a release
from Mr. Mirandy which permitted Ms. Thoburn access to his file," 34 yet the court
never returned to the point to address why it thought the fact was significant. The
court's emphasis on this release is particularly curious since the court concluded
that the quasi attorney-client privilege belonged exclusively to the insurer, and not
to the insured. It is unlikely that the court was suggesting that through the release
the insured waived the attorney-client privilege claim protecting the file, since that
construction would have made significant portions of the succeeding discussion
unnecessary. Concluding that a waiver of the privilege protection was effected
through the release also would have been inconsistent with established principles of
waiver by joint clients.
When parties jointly retain an attorney, they jointly possess the privilege
protection that extended to their discussions with the lawyer. Being a jointly held
right, waiver historically has been permitted only with the consent of all joint par-
ticipants.35 Since Allstate did not acquiesce, there could have been no waiver. More
fundamentally, however, if, as the court noted, the privilege is the insurer's alone,
the conduct of the insured toward the file should be irrelevant. Similarly, Mirandy's
release could not reasonably be interpreted as an assignment to Thoburn by
Mirandy of his claim against Allstate, thereby making Thoburn his successor-in-
interest, possessing the same discovery rights that Mirandy would have possessed
had he brought the action on his own behalf.
Under the court's interpretation of the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices
Act, both Thoburn and Mirandy had the same duty owed to them by Allstate.
Therefore, the court's "new" privilege, or modification of the existing privilege,
appears to stem solely from the statutorily created duty that has been found to be
owed to third-parties by insurance companies when they engage in settlement ne-
gotiations. Thus, Thoburn should have had to justify his requested access to the
claim file-overriding the attorney-client privilege that protected communications
within it-under an exception to the privilege. Instead, the court chose the awk-
ward path of creating a new privilege for this limited situation-a "quasi attorney-
client privilege"-that is identical to the old attorney-client privilege in all respects
Id. at 86.
35 See, e.g., John Morrell & Co. v. Local Union 304A of United Food and Commercial Workers,
AFL-CIO, 913 F.2d 544, 555-56 (8th Cir. 1990); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 & 89-4, 902 F.2d 244,
250 (4th Cir. 1990) ("[W]e hold that all documents that relate to the prosecution of the claim against the
Army as to the defense of the Army's counterclaim, and which are subject to the attorney-client or work-
product privilege are subject to a joint defense privilege that Subsidiary may not waive unilaterally."); United
States v. Stotts, 870 F.2d 288, 290 (5th Cir. 1989) (one criminal defendant cannot present testimony of attor-
ney who would repeat statements by other codefendants protesting the first defendant's innocence when the
other codefendants object); Holland v. Island Creek Corp., 885 F. Supp. 4, 7 (D.D.C. 1995) (" m11he trustees'
unilateral disclosure of privileged information without the consent of the joint privilege-holders, BCOA,
cannot waive the privilege for the documents."; Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 29
(N.D. III. 1980) ("the joint defense privilege cannot be waived without the consent of all parties to the de-
fense."); In re Scranton Corp., 37 F.R.D. 465, 469-70 (D. Pa. 1965) ("[W]here consultation was had by
,several' clients jointly, the waiver should be joint for joint statements, and one could not waive for the dis-
closure of another's statements.").
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(i.e., its elements, how and when it is asserted, who has the burden of persuasion,
etc.)36 except for the fact that it can be overridden by a demonstration of good cause
or substantial need.
V. NOT A NEW PRIVILEGE-AN EXCEPTION TO THE OLD
Historically, the attorney-client privilege has been absolute in the protec-
tion it affords confidential communications between an attorney and his client.
Unless the privilege protection is waived, it provides an absolute protection to con-
fidential communications37 that even survives the death of the client.38 Apparently
breaking from tradition, the court in Gaughan concluded that an insurance com-
pany's claim of attorney-client privilege could be overridden by a showing of
"good cause" in an action for their alleged bad faith in the settlement of a claim
against a policyholder.39 This inconsistency, however, is more illusory than real.
Contrary to the Gaughan Court's assertion, the result is consistent, if not identical,
to the approach taken by the court in Dunn,40 and both decisions are consistent with
an established, and growing body of case law (beginning with the federal decision
in Garner v. Wolfinbarger41), where an exception to the privilege has been recog-
nized for third-party beneficiaries. Those beneficiaries have been permitted to dis-
cover confidential attorney-client communications between fiduciaries and attor-
neys who advised them about matters relating to their fiduciary duties to the dis-
covering beneficiary.
Also'consistent with the Dunn Court, the Gaughan decision did not explain
why it was appropriate for the insurance company to be denied, vis-a-vis the in-
sured and his successful victims, the right to have confidential communications
with counsel after the fiduciary relationship had ended and an adversarial proceed-
ings by the insured, his successor-in-interest or third-party beneficiary had begun.
Since the alleged bad faith settlement effort will have occurred before the judg-
3 Gaughan, 508 S.E.2d at 89-90.
37 See Hodge v. Garten, 182 S.E. 582, 583 (,V. Va. 1935) (stating "[t]here is no rule of law better
settled than that an attorney shall not be permitted to divulge any matter communicated to him in professional
confidence"); Thomas v. Jones, 141 S.E. 434, 437 (W. Va. 1928) (observing that "the rule strictly followed
in this State [is] that communications between client and attorney are privileged and cannot be divulged"
unless an exception applies); Woodrum v. Price, 140 S.E. 346, 349 (V. Va. 1927) (noting that it is "well
established that communications between lawyer and client are privileged, and are inadmissible upon objec-
tion"); Donohoe v. Collett, 105 S.E. 265, 266 (,V. Va. 1920) (stating that the "rule of privilege between
attorney and client is strict and rigid"); State v. Douglass, 20 W. Va. 770, 780 (1882) (stating that "it is a
fundamental principle of the law of evidence, that professional communications made by a client to his coun-
sel, are always to be excluded from the jury") (emphasis in original).
3 See State v. Fisher, 27 S.E.2d 581, 583 (W. Va. 1943) (noting that" [i]t is settled law in this State
that a communication to an attorney by a client or former client dealing with relation as attorney and client is
grivileged") (emphasis added). See also Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
See State ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gaughan, 508 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1998).
40 Florida gives an absolute right of access to all prejudgment attorney-client communications and a
right of access to privileged post-judgment communications in a claim file after "good cause" has been
demonstrated.
41 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1968).
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ment, and the communication that would likely establish that bad faith would have
occurred during that same time period, the extension of the right of access to privi-
leged communication after this time upon a showing of good cause may pose more
of a theoretical threat than an actual one. This is particularly true if the "good
cause" requires an assessment of the company's need for effective legal assistance
in defending itself.
A. The Fiduciary Duty Exception
The source of this fiduciary duty exception to the privilege was Garner,42 a
shareholder derivative action in which shareholders sued for the benefit of the cor-
poration as a whole. Subsequently, in Fausek v. White, the theory was expanded to
nonderivative shareholder actions, 43 and more recently, as discussed infra, to nu-
merous other fiduciary situations.
Because the Garner Court premised the holding on the common law of
trust and fiduciary relationships, rather than on concepts peculiar to corporate law,
courts have extended Garner's balancing of interests approach when they assess
the applicability of the attorney-client privilege beyond the corporate stockholder
action. Courts have begun to extend the balancing of interests approach to con-
flicting interests claims in a variety of fiduciary contexts where the recognition of
the privilege would favor the interests of one principal over the other. Examples
include a suit by the Secretary of Labor against the former officials of a pension
fund for violation of their fiduciary duties;44 a suit between a limited partner and a
general partner in the same general partnership; 45 actions by union members against
the union officers;' an action by trust beneficiaries against the trust and its
trustee;47 an action by excess insurer against the primary insurer;48 an action by
creditors against the bankruptcy creditor's committee;49 actions by minority share-
42 Id.
43 See, e.g., Fausek v. White, 965 F.2d 126, 130 (6th Cir. 1992) ("Selox maintains that Garner ap-
plies only in shareholder derivative actions and that all policy considerations favor applying the privilege in
cases where the plaintiffs act only for their own benefit rather than on behalf of the corporation.... Nothing
in the language or the reasoning of Garner, as expressed by Judge Godbold, so limits its holding."); Ward v.
Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d 780, 786 (5th Cir. 1988) (rejecting the argument that Garner applies only to
derivative suits); Quintel Corp., N.V. v. Citibank, N.A., 567 F. Supp. 1357, 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding
that the Garner decision is based in part "on the recognition that because of the mutuality of interest between
the parties, the faithful fiduciary has nothing to hide from his beneficiary"); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55
F.R.D. 211, 213 (N.D. III. 1972) ("the attorney-client privilege [does] not bar a shareholder-plaintiff in a
derivative suit from discovering the communications between his corporation and its counsel").
44 See Donovan v. Fitzsimmons, 90 F.R.D. 583 (N.D. I11. 1981).
45 See Ferguson v. Lurie, 139 F.R.D. 362 (N.D. I11. 1991); Quintel Corp., N.V. v. Citibank, N.A., 567
F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
46 See Mallick v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 749 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Aguinage v.
John Morrell & Co., 112 F.R.D. 671 (D. Kan. 1986).
47 See Helt v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 113 F.R.D. 7, 9 (D. Conn. 1986); Washington Baltimore
Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v. Washington Star Co., 543 F. Supp. 906 (D.D.C. 1982).
48 See Central Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Medical Protective Co., 107 F.R.D. 393 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
49 See In re Baldwin-United Corp., 38 B.R. 802 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984).
[Vol. 101:311
14
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol101/iss2/4
A QUASI-AYTORNEY-CLIENTPRIVILEGE?
holders against majority shareholders;o and an action on behalf of a corporation
against the law firm that represented the corporation."1 In some state courts the
Garner exception has been extended to third-party bad faith suits against insurers.
52
The key element in the expansion of the Garner logic has been the mutu-
ality of interests between the fiduciaries and the beneficiaries. As long as this mu-
tuality of interests existed at the time of the communication with counsel, and the
subject of the communication was the fulfillment of an expressed or implied fiduci-
ary duty, the beneficiary, and the beneficiary's successor-in-interest, should have a
right, upon a showing of need, to access those communications in order to deter-
mine whether the fiduciary has fulfilled his legal responsibilities.
B. The Fiduciary Duty Exception and Gaughan
While the court's reasoning in Gaughan is sound, its "quasi attorney-client
privilege" is an awkward characterization of what the court actually recognized.
The elements of both the established privilege and the "new" privilege are the
same, as is the burden that must initially be borne by the proponent of both privi-
leges. The "new" differs from the "old" only in that it recognizes when good
cause has been demonstrated. At the heart of the Gaughan Court's reasoning is a
recognition of a duty, albeit a statutory duty rather than a contractual or common
law one, that the insurance company owed to the insured. Consistent with estab-
lished principles originating in the Garner decision, the Gaughan Court did nothing
more than recognize that if an insured, or a third-party, to whom an insurance com-
pany owes the same statutory duty of good faith and fair dealing, can demonstrate
"good cause" or "a compelling need" for the discovery of post-judgment commu-
nications, they both should be given the same access to the files in which those
communications are contained.
VI. CONCLUSION
The attorney-client privilege is fundamental to an effective attorney-client
relationship. Over the centuries the privilege has become highly complex and con-
fusing because of its many wrinkles and machinations. The confusion that has re-
sulted should not be exacerbated by cluttering its landscape with "quasi" labels
and applications.
Generally, evidentiary rules should be interpreted and applied in ways that
are consistent with their underlying principles. Less conspicuous, but equally im-
portant to our jurisprudence, is the need for state courts, to the extent practicable,
and consistent with legal precedents and social policies, to make every effort to
50 See In re Transocean Tender Offer Sec. Litig. 78 F.R.D. 692 (N.D. 11. 1978).
51 See In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., MDL No. 655 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 1989).
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define the substantive principles of universally recognized rules like the attorney-
client privilege as consistently as possible. Such consistency minimizes confusion
and accommodates choice of law issues by minimizing their importance.53 Courts
must be conscious of the broader implications of their holdings and their responsi-
bility to accurately place each decision on the complex substantive grid to which it
is being added.
See supra note 51, at §§ 12:1-12:21.
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